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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/05/2006 Accident number: 217 
Accident time: 08:05 Accident Date: 22/04/1998 
Where it occurred: Jewish cemetery, 
Grbavica, Sarajevo 
Country: Bosnia Herzegovina 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 25/04/1998 
ID original source: CS/WL Name of source: BiH MAC 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMA-2 AP blast Ground condition: metal scrap 
residential/urban 
route/path 
Date record created: 16/02/2004 Date  last modified: 16/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: Sarajevo Map series: M709 
Map edition: WGS 84 Map sheet: 2782 I 
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
incomplete detonation (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 
 
Accident report 
A Board of Inquiry report was ordered by the country MAC and their field investigation was 
observed by a representative of the demining group. The report was made available and is 
reproduced below (edited for anonymity). 
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Dated: 25 April 1998 
 
REPORT ON MINE ACCIDENT AT THE JEWISH CEMETERY IN SARAJEVO 
References   
A: Map, Series M709, Sheet 2782-I, Sarajevo. (WGS 84) 
B:  UN Mine Action Centre Technical Guidelines. Dated 1 Dec 1997. 




1. A mine accident occurred near the Jewish Cemetery in Sarajevo on 22 April 
1998 at Approximately 0800 hours. A local deminer stepped on a PMA-2 mine in an area 
that had been cleared previously by [Demining group]. The deminer stated that he felt 
numbness in his right leg.  [Demining group] reports that no injuries were sustained by 
anyone. 
2. On the day of the accident HQ MAC appointed [name excised] as chairman of an 
investigative board to conduct an investigation and report about the accident. Lt Colonel 
[name excised], EOD Coordinator at HQ MAC was appointed as a member of the board. 
[Name excised] represented the company on site but was not an investigating member of 
the board.  
 CONDUCT OF THE INVESTIGATION 
3. Local police, IPTF and bomb-specialists from the Federation police were on the 
site approximately 24 hours before the MAC Board of Inquiry visited the scene.  
4. Prepared statements from the team leader and the local supervisor of the team 
involved were provided to HQ MAC on the day of the accident. No further statements 
were taken during the course of the investigation. A [Demining group] internal report 
about the accident was distributed prior to the initiation of the MAC Board of Inquiry. This 
report is shown at Annex A.  
5. Photographs of the mine and the surrounding area were provided to the Board of 
Inquiry by [Demining group] at approximately 1900 hours on the day of the accident. 
These are shown at Annex B.  
6. A video film of the mine and surrounding area was shown to the Board on 24 
April 1998.  
7. Both members of the investigating board arrived on the task site with [Demining 
group representative] at approximately 1200hrs on 23 April 98. At this time the area of the 
accident was inspected and an assessment was made of the site layout and conduct of 
[Demining group] operations on the site. 
GENERAL 
8. [Demining group] state that they have been working on this site since the end of 
February. The area of the Jewish cemetery is part of a larger task in the area of Grbavica. 
9. MAC Regional Officer responsible for this area states that demands have been 
made by anonymous telephone calls, warning him to stop the demining at this site.  
GEOGRAPHY 
10. The accident site area is on a rough footpath that leads uphill by the outside of 
the wall of the Jewish cemetery. Rebuilding work is taking place on some houses 
approximately one hundred metres away from the accident, next to the start of the 
2 
clearance lane. The lane is not heavily vegetated but there is some growth down one side 
and around the footpath.  
SITE LAYOUT 
11. The area of the accident site is marked and taped-off. Marking of the clearance 
lane is adequate. 
12. The lane where the accident occurred is an access lane, leading to further 
clearance areas. The lane is approximately three metres wide, vegetation is very sparse 
on one side of the lane due to the passage of people over the ground.  
13. Vegetation over the remaining area of the lane, including where the mine was, is 
sparse. 
14. Small twigs, pieces of tripwire and metal, building debris and broken bricks in the 
lane suggest that the area of the mine was not cleared recently or just prior to the arrival 
of the Board of Inquiry’s arrival at the site. [Demining group representative] states that the 
lane was cleared during the earlier part of demining in this area, at about the beginning of 
March. 
PERSONALITIES 
15. Personnel directly involved are as follows.  
[Demining group] Project Manager. 
[Demining group] Senior demining supervisor. 
Supervisor of No. 1 demining platoon. 
Supervisor. 
Team Leader who activated the mine. 
Deminer. 
DOGS 
16. No dogs were involved for mine or explosive detection or to assist Quality 
Assurance at this site at any time. 
EQUIPMENT 
17. Metal detectors are difficult to use on this site because there is such a large 
amount of contamination from metal scrap and fragments.  
18. Prodders were used as a standard part of the demining team’s equipment in the 
manner approved by HQ MAC Technical Guidelines.  
DRESS 
19. Protective clothing and headgear was worn by all personnel involved at the 
accident site. 
20. All protective clothing provided by [Demining group] to demining teams is 
designed to provide a minimum protection to the wearer against 1.1g fragments travelling 
at a velocity of 450 metres per second. 
DETAILED ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITIES ON 22 APRIL 1998 
21. This account is taken from interviews with [Demining group representative] and 
from prepared statements from some of the personnel on site at the time of the accident. 
Interviews with deminers or other personnel were not conducted because all personnel 
were on leave during the day of the investigation. 
22. The demining team started work as normal on the day of the accident at about 
0800hrs. 
23. Shortly after arrival on site, Team Leader [the victim] was walking up the hill, 
along the access lane with three deminers, with the intention of deploying them to their 
tasks. 
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24. After deploying one of the deminers to his task, [the victim] states that he walked 
along by the cemetery wall, collecting UXO waste. He saw a small piece of tripwire on the 
lane and was about to pick it up when he actuated a PMA-2 anti personnel mine by 
standing on it. The mine did not detonate fully. Photographic evidence shows that this 
was apparently due to its age and poor condition. The mine is in the custody of the police 
and has not been examined by the Board of Inquiry. 
EVIDENCE OF RE-MINING 
25. [Demining group] states that this mine is a re-laid mine. The following evidence is 
given by [Demining group] in support of this claim. 
The photographs and video-film show a mine that is laid with its shoulders flush 
with ground level, almost surface laid. 
The soil surrounding the mine is soft. 
The mine was covered by fresh-plucked grass. 
The mine was laid within approximately 30 centimetres from a mine that was 
removed during the original lane clearance operation by [Demining group]. 
The lane has been used as an access lane for some weeks and has been 
walked on by many people in that time, including [Demining group] 
manager, [name excised] and a group of journalists. 
26. The Board of Inquiry considered the following points. 
27. It is not possible to state conclusively whether the photographs or the video show 
the mine in the position it was in immediately prior to its partial detonation. 
28. The mine did not operate fully. This was probably because it was in such a poor 
condition. It is possible that the mine was in such a poor condition because it had been 
laid in the ground for a long time. 
29. There are instances in Bosnia Herzegovina where mines have been walked over 
many times before they have detonated. This could especially be the case if the mine 
was in a poor condition. 
30. The Board of Inquiry considered the soil surrounding the mine at the site as the 
same as the soil everywhere else in the area. 
31. The Board of Inquiry saw no fresh-plucked grass in the area. No fresh-plucked 
grass is shown on the photographs taken by [Demining group].  
32. The mine is a minimum-metal mine, in this area it could be missed if a metal 
detector was used over the ground because there is so much surface and sub-surface 
“clutter” in the area. It could also be missed when prodding because there is a 
considerable amount of debris, including bricks and stones, on the area. 
33. The mine was laid in an apparently arbitrary position; it was not on the area of 
the lane where people currently usually walk, but on the side where vegetation and debris 
hinders easy passage along the pathway. The mine was not laid in a place where it could 
be fairly certain of being walked on shortly after it was laid. It was also not laid in a place 
from where it would have been easy to escape or walk away from if the layer had been 
disturbed in the act of laying the mine. 
34. There is no reported history of re-mining at any clearance sites in Sarajevo or at 
demining sites where [Demining group], Jews or Cemeteries are involved.  
SUMMARY 
35. A Team Leader partially detonated a PMA-2 mine whilst deploying his team to 
their tasks. [Demining group] state that this mine was a re-laid mine. There is an equal 
amount of evidence to show that it could have been a mine that was missed on the 
original clearance of the lane. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
36. There is no proof or conclusive evidence that this was a missed mine or a re-laid 
mine. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
37. The following recommendations are made. 
a. The clearance task in this area should continue. 
b. When an area is cleared, all UXOs and associated debris should be removed from 
the area.  
c. Areas where a mine accident has occurred should be closed until a HQ MAC Board 
of Inquiry arrives to inspect the site. Personnel and equipment should be available to 
assist the investigation. 
d. Distribution of internal reports on mine accidents should be restricted until after the 
findings from an independent Board of Inquiry have been presented. 
e. The entire lane where the accident occurred should be re-cleared. This would 
probably be best achieved by the use of at least one mine-detecting dog. 
Signed: EOD Coordinator, Quality Assurance Officer 
 
Annexes 
Annex A - [Demining group] Mine Accident Report. 
Annex B  - Photographs of Accident area. 
 
Distribution 






Victim number: 281 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: none Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Helmet 
Short visor 
Protection used: Frag jacket, Helmet, 
Short visor 
 





No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because it seems 
that the mine was missed because appropriately thorough clearance methods were not 
used. 
In the absence of other information, I assume that the mine was missed during routine 
clearance. The litter around the mine included bits of tripwire that should have been removed 
during clearance, implying poor field management. 
It is possible that the deminers (all local and from mixed backgrounds) deliberately placed the 
partially detonated device in order to get away from a site where they felt threatened. There is 
no evidence that they had been consulted about their feelings over clearing a sensitive spot. 
Just how sensitive it was is a real question, but the demining group's internal documents 
showed that they felt it to be sensitive. 
 
Related papers 
An internal "Mine accident report" from the demining group was on file. This stated that the 
UN MAC had received several threats to stop demining at the site which was a Jewish 
cemetery. [The UN MAC staff denied this when questioned by the researcher.] After the 
accident the group stopped demining at the site and informed their Embassy, head office, 
the UN MAC and the local police. The police attended the scene at 14:10. 
Statements from the personnel involved included one from the victim in which he said that he 
checked the accident area with a prod before moving after the accident. He "felt a 
numbness" in his right leg. He thought that the photographs would prove his point that the 
mine was recently laid. 
Photographs on file showed the top of the mine in the ground, broken. There could be "fresh 
plucked" grass among the debris on the ground. However the mine was at least 50cm 
outside the area where people usually walked and was on the inside of a yellow post 
(showing the previous mine find) that people would normally veer to avoid. This makes it 
unlikely that it was laid by someone who wanted it to be trodden on.   
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